Mozambique, the study reveals how a highly politicised crackdown led to uneven consequences.
INTRODUCTION
In many regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, the mining sector is expanding rapidly and attracting considerable attention as a source of political struggle and conflict. Ever since the discovery of diamond deposits in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands in 2006, a burgeoning body of scholarly literature has been examining the politics of conflict in the diamond mining sector in Zimbabwe (Nyota & Sibanda 2012; Towriss 2013; Nyamunda & Mukwambo 2012; Spiegel 2014 ). However, little research has been devoted to the socio-political dimensions of conflict in Zimbabwe's gold mining sector, which provides livelihoods to a considerably larger number of people, with as many as two million people across the country deriving livelihoods from artisanal and small-scale gold mining (Shoko & Veiga 2004; Mawowa 2013 ). The present article addresses this research gap by examining legacies of a violent period in Zimbabwe' What are the long-lasting socio-political legacies of the crackdown? The study contributes to a growing body of scholarship addressing the policing of artisanal mining in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Geenen 2012; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007; Duffy 2007; Maconachie 2013) while also responding to recent calls in the literature for more empirically rooted and historically specific studies on the complex ramifications of state reconfigurations in rural Zimbabwe (Alexander & McGregor 2013) .
In broad scholarly accounts of resource politics in Africa, theories of 'state failure' have frequently been embraced to explain conflict and disorder in contexts where official state institutions have (or appear to have) limited relevance, in some cases modelling analyses around the much-cited work of Chabal and Daloz (1999) or Reno (1999) . West African contexts of 'weak states' have often guided meta-theoretical analyses. However, with respect to contemporary struggles in Zimbabwe, Alexander and McGregor (2013) caution against oversimplifications in theorizing 'that commonly assume [state] "weakness" and "disorder" and which diminish state institutions to a facade for "real" or "shadow" economies ' (p. 750) .
In understanding the politics surrounding elite actors' accumulation strategies in Zimbabwe, they caution against downplaying the actual on-the-ground functioning and impacts of state power, where post-revolutionary discourses of empowerment have provided ideological justification by elites for heavy-handed state interventions that have a strong 'disciplining' character. Conceptualizing the experiences of a state crackdown involves complex dilemmas in Zimbabwe, where state power has been experienced in a myriad of complex and idiosyncratic ways. The study thus contributes to debates in wider African studies literature addressing political contexts where the 'reach' of the state has been extensive and where the indirect and direct effects of politicized state surveillance have emerged in diverse forms (Purdeková 2011; McGregor 2013) . To address one particular arena of 'experiencing the state' in Zimbabwe, this study draws on interviews with artisanal gold miners and other people living in gold mining areas to ascertain how Operation Chikoroza Chapera impacted daily life, and it provides the first systematic study of the legacies of this operation.
Fieldwork for the study involved in-depth interviews conducted between 2006 and 2013 in gold mining regions in the districts of Insiza, Umzginwani and Kadoma as well as Bulawayo and Harare; it also involved participant observation work analysing the advocacies of artisanal and small-scale miners associations during this period, as well as interviews along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in gold mining sites in the Chimanimani highlands.
Challenging the dominant government discourses on Operation Chikorokoza Chapera as a mechanism needed for 'restoring order and sanity', the study shows how the multifarious consequences of the operation were at odds with its purported objectives, providing a vivid illustration of the consequences of a politically volatile policing apparatus that was increasingly engaging in violent displacement as part of a strategy of state rule (Hammar et al. 2010; Groves 2012) . Mabhena (2012) and Kamete (2008) provide contextual analysis of the growth of artisanal gold mining as a livelihood strategy in different regions of Zimbabwe, and Mawowa (2013) examines political patronage in relation to mining, providing important contributions to an evolving debate on elite resource capture. However, the consequences of policing activities that emerged from Operation Chikorokoza Chapera have been Bringing 'visibility' to the experiences of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera requires attention to the diverse locales in which gold mining was occurring and highly diverse people involved as artisanal miners. The fieldwork thus included visits to primary ore gold mining and milling locations as well as alluvial riverbed gold panning sites, and notably included interviews with artisanal miners at gold mining sites on a Canadian company's mining claim in Kadoma, an Insiza District Member of Parliament's mining claim, a riverbed gold mining site that was temporarily run by a Chinese mining company in a water catchment where Insiza District intersects with Umzingwani District, an Israeli-owned gold mill in Insiza, and two mills owned and run by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, among other places. The interview selection process involved strategic sampling and snowball sampling and formed part of a PhD dissertation that drew from interviews that took place over a seven year period with more than 150 artisanal miners from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. In some cases, the artisanal miners were former subsistence farmers, while others had a long family history of gold mining; in some cases, interviewees were temporary artisanal miners who had recently entered the sector (e.g. former school teachers). Some interviewees identified as 'local' to the area in which they mined, while other artisanal miners interviewed had travelled from afar. In some cases, artisanal miners who were interviewed in 2006 or 2007 were interviewed again in 2009, 2012 or 2013 to facilitate a longitudinal analysis.
Working with artisanal and small-scale miners associations, the author was afforded access to a large number of gold mining sites and interviewees were often very willing and eager to share views and introduce the author to others. Nonetheless, there were significant challenges in the field research as the study took place during a period of significant economic hardship and political instability. Sensitivities relating to unlicensed mining activities were carefully respected and identities of informants have been anonymized. In addition to conducting interviews on-site in gold mining locations, interviews also took place at homes of artisanal miners, bars, vehicles and other locations. The validity and reliability of data was enhanced by triangulating fieldwork interview data with multiple sources, combining primary data sources with secondary sources and public domain documents (e.g. legal court proceedings relating to specific mines visited and parliamentary records).
To contextualise the consequences of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, the first section below briefly discusses the government's official rationales for the crackdown, which drew on economic and environmental discourses as well as 'the need for order.' The article then highlights how the crackdown resulted in physical violence as well as devastating effects on livelihoods. The analysis provides a micro-level descriptive account of policing artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in areas where no mining licenses were held as well as where ASM activities were informally occurring on sites where companies held mining and milling licenses. The consequences reveal the failure of the operation with respect to its own stated objectives. To appreciate the legacy of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, the article discusses not only the impacts that occurred at the time but also the highly contested long-term nature The final part of the article's analysis addresses the agency of marginalised groups affected by coercive state tactics. In analysing the impacts of Operation Murambatsvina on urban dwellers, Kamete (2010; argued that it is vital to understand the impact of coercive power in Zimbabwe in terms of its effects on the agency of displaced communities and their recovery strategies. His approach also calls for attention to 'mutating practices that are no more than by-products of trial and error, always powered by the desire to defend threatened livelihood practices' (Kamete 2010; 56) . A nuanced understanding of agency is equally important when conceptualising Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. The article thus examines some of the advocacies of artisanal miners and mining association leaders that spoke on their behalf, particularly the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF), an umbrella organisation that represents 30 small-scale miners' associations across the country.
CONTEXTUALISING OPERATION CHIKOROKOZA CHAPERA AS THE ECONOMY PLUNGED Zimbabwe's protracted economic crisis has been interpreted in a myriad of ways since 2000 (Bond 2007; Bracking 2009; Chaumba et al. 2003) and, as Hammar (2008) (Jones 2010a; Jones 2010b) . International critics of ZANU-PF widely asserted that the accelerated decline of Zimbabwe's economy might leave President Mugabe 'without the cash to pay off those on whom his political survival will depend' (Bremmer, 2007) . Minerals -particularly gold and diamonds -were widely regarded as opportunities for corruption (Moore & Mawowa 2010) . Meanwhile, scholars have recognized that theories of politicized resource control should not overshadow the increasingly important role that ASM -often with very rudimentary gold extraction practices -was playing as a survival strategy to marginalised segments of society (Mawowa 2013; Tendai et al. 2012) . In this sense, gold extraction emerged as an ever-more politically ambiguous sector, where informal livelihoods and elite actor's interests sometimes co-exist but also compete, resonating in certain ways with observations elsewhere in Africa on the political character of 'criminalised networks' in the mineral extraction sector (e.g. Duffy, 2007 As the environmental hazards of small-scale gold mining are well known -and a frequent point of focus in the scholarly community (Tunhuma et al. 2007; Zwane et al. 2006) , these concerns were also invoked as a reason for the crackdown. In rationalising the complete criminalisation of riverbed alluvial gold panning, the Minister of Tourism and Environment, Mr. Nhema, commented: 'As government, we have banned [gold] panning activities because we have collectively come to the conclusion that the environmental costs emanating from the panning activities far outweigh the benefits accruing to the panners' (Xinhua, 2007) . In the remaining part of the gold mining sector -primary ore (land-based) gold mining, opportunities to operate in the legal sphere were still theoretically available, but the imposition of new barriers to the acquisition of licenses, with the sudden introduction (in 
IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE CRACKDOWN

Diverse Experiences of Policing: Immediate Impacts
Just as 'state power creates, through its administrative and bureaucratic practices, a world of meanings' (Mbembe 1992; 2) , state power, as channeled through Operation
Chikorokoza Chapera, produced a world of diverse impacts. Interviewees highlighted multiple dimensions of the violence that ensued. One riverbed panner who had worked in Umzingwani River (near where Umzingwani River intersects with Insiza River) expressed how he saw 'hundreds of miners shackled overnight, without food or water.' 4 A young miner at 20 years old, he also articulated his anxiety with these words: 'My brother was arrested and I don't think I can ever mine again. I don't know what I'll do.' 5 In gold mining and milling sites in Insiza District, the word 'ruthless' was often used to describe police, and interviewees explained that groups of police circled miners and trapped them with no opportunity for
escape. An artisanal miner who worked as part of a group without a license in Filabusi (the district capital of Insiza District, which was heavily dependent on gold mining 6 ) described how police squads would form a horn shape so that miners were trapped: 'The police tried to get us by surrounding us. They got some of us and some makorokozas [illegal miners] are languishing in jail.' Another interviewee, a 31 year old gold panner whose account was similar, indicated that police for the operation were selected deliberately from out-of-town areas: 'The police are not from Insiza District. They [police authorities] took the police from other provinces…This way the police are not sympathetic to us.' 7 In both these accounts, interviewees described shootings, deaths, and drownings in rivers while trying to evade police. These occurrences also were acknowledged by some government officials when interviewed about the fallout.
to increased robberies and other crimes in what had formerly been mining-dependent communities. 11 As expressed by one local government official in Insiza District who was also
visibly frustrated with what was going on, some of the gold miners in the district were reduced to using very labour-intensive hand milling at night so as to evade the police, while others stopped mining and mineral processing activities altogether. Using the memorable image of music, the same government official noted that 'the music stopped…the town life has shut down…The mining has been an essential part of my home town's existence. ' 12 This insight resonated vividly with the findings of Mhiripiri (2013), whose analysis indicated that the music industry in Zimbabwe suffered considerably due to Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, as musicians had depended on makorokozas (artisanal miners) as audiences, and found that their support base was now 'dispersed.' As one government interviewee acknowledged, reflecting on the Insiza area (which was known to some interviewees in Harare as a particularly violent example of where Operation Chikorokoza Chapera impacted miners), 'the police were out of control.' 15 In contrast, some artisanal miners worked in licensed mining areas that were controlled by powerful companies and Zimbabwean war veterans who were politically well-connectedand did not experience the negative impacts of the operation to the same degree. For example, at Pansikwe Mine in Filabusi, certain ZANU-PF elites were able to continue mining and even take over other people's mining sites amid the confusion. These tensions led to conflicts and legal court challenges by frustrated neighbours who sought to resist Pansikwe's growing stranglehold on mining in the region.
16
At the same time, a ZMF member explained that in the Kadoma region, there were informal arrangements that had allowed some ASM workers to mine in companies'
concessions, but, once Operation Chikorokoza Chapera began, those relationships began to fall apart and turn sour, and some miners interviewed spoke of intensified exploitation. Some companies that previously allowed ASM workers on their territory were suddenly blaming those same workers and rhetorically supporting the government's police activities. According to the Chief Mining Commissioner, few mining companies in Zimbabwe had formalised agreements to allow artisanal miners to work on their land. 17 Discussion with ZMF members suggested that, although the notion of tributing 18 was supposed to apply whenever companies lease areas to miners, this rarely was implemented. Despite the existence of policies to formalise relationships between ASM groups and mining license holders, and despite policies to enable small-scale mining to be legitimised, these policies had limited relevance during
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera.
An example of a licensed mining operation (where artisanal miners were also working) that was significantly impacted by the crackdown was a gold mill near Esigodini, in
Umzingwani, closed for a year and a half due to Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, according to the mill owner. Artisanal and small-scale miners who brought ore to the mill were chased away by police and beaten up and shot at, according to his description. In other cases in nearby mills, the crackdown had the effect of increasing the amount of bribe money that miners had to pay the police; other mill owners described how they would give police officers meals, cash and gold as bribe money, though poorer miners usually could not afford to make such bribes.
Crackdowns also had the effect of shifting the geography of mining rather than stopping mining; for instance, crackdowns triggered a migration of some miners to the 21 Operation Chikorokoza Chapera provides a sectorspecific context for conceptualising 'how the processes and experiences of displacement have reconfigured Zimbabwean geographies, political economies and social forms' as well as contributed to 'processes of change within neighbouring countries' (Hammar et al. 2010; 264) .
Ultimately, while narratives of micro-politics are often contested, some facts have garnered widespread consensus. First, by April 2007, after just the first five months of the crackdown, police had arrested an estimated 25,000 small-scale miners across Zimbabwe. 22 Second, the crackdown forced many people out of their livelihoods -in some cases, creating fear in ways that motivated miners never to return to mining, while in other cases, creating an impossible-to-control mining environment as a result of cat-and-mouse relations with police.
In some areas, police intimidation created a culture of rushed mining activity, leaving rivers more prone to environmental mismanagement and creating a scenario where mercury use was more precarious in the gold amalgamation process. Thirdly, in addition to the operation failing to meet its purported environmental and economic objectives, small-scale miners argued that the policing activities produced far more 'disorder' than they suppressed, with multiple police CID units, military officials, CIO spies and ZANU-PF youth squads involved.
Amid hyperinflationary gold pricing imbalances, bureaucratic delays in paying producers for gold output, institutional confusion and conflict, Zimbabwe's official gold production declined from 11 tonnes in 2006 to just over 7 tonnes in 2007, the lowest level of output in over a hundred years (Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office, 2008) . Fourthly, while the crackdown left the country's national budget poorer as a result of expensive police workspending a great deal on fuel, among other costs, it was well-known that certain businessmen became richer, profiting from the illegal gold trade. In the early period of the crackdown, Chikorokoza Chapera highlighted the apparently 'arbitrary state' in producing profound uncertainty in mining areas; simultaneously, given the lucrative value of gold, the deployment of violence and the production of confusion served multifarious economic and political ends. The display of state power was such that one commentator concluded that the operation was not just about accumulating wealth but also about deliberately dispossessing others as a form of political disciplining: 'Make no mistake, this loss of livelihood is not an incidental side-effect of the operation, but it is its very raison d'être' (Sokwanele, 2007) .
Legacies of Operation Chikorokzoza Chapera as a Repressive Phenomenon
The physical impact of the crackdown transformed countless gold mining areas -and beyond. Roadblocks were set up throughout the country to search private and public transport vehicles for minerals, and those suspected of illegality were arrested. As a member of the ZMF noted, the intense and at times brutal crackdowns were clearly not proportional to the 'crime' of unlicensed mining; the attacks on miners seemed to be routinely excessive, revealing a level of violence that defied a simplistic utilitarian logic of material/resource control. 24 As part of a group discussion with ZMF members in April 2009, participants were asked to list five of the most important impacts of the crackdown for miners, and the following points emerged: (1) The Gwanda prison location listed in Table 1 covered mines around Filabusi and the gold mining regions visited in Insiza District. As interviewees in Insiza had emphasized, police were particularly unsympathetic there. 28 The number of prisoners in Gwanda may be higher than other regions partly because there were large numbers of miners in this region and partly because of the nature of the policing. These policing and incarceration dynamics may be analogous in other districts, though the degree to which that is the case falls beyond the scope of this study. The point in including the numbers in Table 1 is not to suggest that these are the exact numbers of mining-related prisoners in Zimbabwe; in fact, the seven prisons listed here are not the only prisons in Zimbabwe. Rather, the point is that incarcerations were conditioning the discourses that small-scale miners used when speaking about the challenges that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera created. Small-scale miners were widely aware of the unprecedented scale of imprisonment in the mining sector.
Importantly though, the ability to obtain the numbers listed in the above table is itself an illustration of the changing national political context for debating mining sector injustices in 2012 -as parliamentarians officially requested these numbers; in fact, the Zimbabwe
Miners Federation had been given the official mandate from the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Mining to document the number of miners in prison. In this sense, Table 1 
Legacies of Lost Rights and Post-Crackdown Rent-Seeking
After policing activities started to subside, there were renewed attempts by smallscale miners at gaining formal legal recognition in 2009, albeit often unsuccessfully. In interviewing primary ore gold miners at their mining locations in Insiza, Umzingwani and Kadoma, it was ascertained that small-scale miners often did not know how to register for mining claims or simply had no access to registration opportunities. These problems were exacerbated by the widespread lack of faith that proper registration procedures would be followed by mining licensing authorities. Many women and men involved in artisanal indicated clearly that they would like to become 'legal', even if it meant paying more taxes and fees, but they were not sure how or whether their finances could cover the actual (official and 'unofficial') costs of licenses. 29 Furthermore, although national laws provided some degree of space for legalizing hard rock gold mining, the laws passed during the crackdown precluded Rural District Councils from being able to offer licenses for riverbed panning. The consequences of the lost right to pan for alluvial gold in riverbeds constitutes a particularly important and controversial legacy of the crackdown, as discussed below. 31 Admitting that this 'contribution' to the community was far too little, he was angry with the environmental destruction caused by the company. The Chinese company used large excavators and bulldozers -equipment that had not previously been utilized in this river -and concerns were raised that this negatively impacted the environment (as well as precluding local panners from panning for alluvial gold in the river). According to a member of the Filabusi Miners Association, both MDC-affiliated and ZANU-PF-affiliated Council Members in Insiza District were also angry about the Chinese company's destructive activities in the river, a major water source in the area, and they were reportedly active in pressuring the company to leave in 2012. The monetary benefits of this type of 'temporarily formalised' river mining were also questioned, with miners noting and that it was unlikely that any taxes from the mine went to the government. could not afford the high costs for license fees. Some miners felt that they had to wait until the fees were lowered before officially resuming their mining operations. Milling centre costs had also been raised in 2012, with milling license fees raised from USD 2,000 to USD 8,000
(millers also issued complaints to the Ministry of Mines).
The notion that Operation Chikorokoza led to 'lost rights' needs to be understood in relation to a highly dynamic and fragmented political state, in which, as discussed by
McGregor (2013) indigenous Zimbabweans would benefit from re-structured ownership of businesses under a new "empowerment' agenda 33 , yet small-scale miners widely emphasized that the Indigenization and Empowerment Act was benefiting an elite group, not communities who were actually profoundly disempowered by Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. One smallscale miner, in a meeting with miners and two government officials, emphasized that the 'idea to empower and indigenize in the mining sector is a good idea' but that the implementation of the Indigenization and Empowerment Act was only 'empowering only the big guys' 34 -meaning the well-connected businessmen.
ADVOCACY STRUGGLES FOLLOWING OPERATION CHIKOROKOZA CHAPERA
While the analysis above provides an overview of key impacts of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, the power to resist -or at least oppose -state repression has been a much-discussed theme with respect to previous state crackdowns in Zimbabwe. As Kamete (2012) points out while analysing Operation Murambatsvina, 'a key shortcoming of modernist perspectives is their insistence on power being an exclusive possession of the dominant group (the authorities) which is deployed against the subordinate group' (p. 72).
This caution has similar relevance in the context of gold mining conflicts. While some smallscale miners had alliances with powerful politicians, many small-scale miners were left to themselves to figure out a coping strategy. Miners were not passive, however. During the crackdowns, miners' associations began actively voicing protest against these patterns of marginalization and criminalisation, taking it upon themselves, in some cases, to educate each other about how they might reclaim equipment that had been stolen by police. Group meetings were held amongst different miners' associations to figure out how -if possiblethey could resume work, how they could develop advocacy to create less unfavourable conditions for ASM and how they could be involved in processes of changing mining policies. As a member of the ZMF explained, 'Many of the small-scale miners associations were completely disbanded during Chikorokoza Chapera…but some stayed together and ZMF has had to become stronger, to make our voices heard.' 35 When theorizing the impact of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera on the advocacy processes of artisanal and small-scale miners, it is important to recognize that the sector's diversity meant that different groups had vastly different ways of coping with, or resisting, state policies. The ZMF invited miners and government officials to meetings that were often the scenes of contested and emotional debate. In some cases, ZMF advocacy processes led to small changes -such as a flexible time period for submission of EIA reports and payment of EIA fees. However, miners' advocacy processes were not without controversy. Early in
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera's implementation, the former President of the ZMF, George Kawonza, told newspapers that 'We support fully the eradication of gold panning in this country but for legally licensed miners to be harassed in this manner is unacceptable' (Makoshori 2007) , alluding to the harassment of miners by police forces. Such a statement might suggest that part of the crackdown's ramifications was that miners were publicly turning against each other -ready to concede that the government was right to criminalise (and try to 'eradicate') gold panning (which is more rudimentary, more associated with polluting water resources, and frequently practiced by poorer miners) -while opposing the government's handling of other types of more controllable and mechanized small-scale mining. More importantly, though, another consequence of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was that it brought some miners together. Small-scale miners held meetings to confront problems emanating from the crackdown, voicing opposition to arrests and explicitly demanding that the government resuscitate support services for the ever-expanding smallscale mining sector. The ZMF issued the following statement in a report to the Ministry of The ZMF policy paper then continued to draw the case for national policy reform, noting that other 'African regions do have Ministries for ASM or have departments within
The Ministry of Mines directly responsible for small scale miners…Zimbabwe should also take a leaf from them' (Zimbabwe Miners Federation, 2009, p 6) . To help make the case that a new special unit for ASM should be developed within Ministry offices, the following was added:
The Zimbabwean Government has put much emphasis on farming completely ignoring the [smallscale] mining industry. Consequently there are multitudes of problems including abject poverty, lack of mining skills, no access to capital, hazardous working conditions, absence of organization, environmental devastation, non-traceability, illegality, harassment by customary and even state authorities. (Zimbabwe Miners Federation, 2009, p. 5) The kind of language offered in the above report, although not particularly militant in tone, was not trivial; advocacy from miners helped to pressure state authorities to take a new approach, fuelled by the fact that small-scale miners represented a growing population and an exceedingly important political constituency. The quotation above perhaps slightly misrepresents the level of political interest and engagement -as government officials were often far from 'ignoring' the sector's value. Nonetheless, in a post-crackdown mind-set, particularly as the prospect of future elections loomed, government leaders were well aware that they needed to show a softer approach than had been used in Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. 36 Table 2 shows the range of issues on the meeting agenda (which included the legalisation of riverbed panning, although this was overshadowed by other agenda items relating to small-scale primary ore mining). As one interviewee remarked (immediately before the meeting), 'This is the first meeting like this in many years…The government never used to allow a meeting like this.' 38 What is particularly noteworthy about the meeting agenda (Table 2 ) is its highlighting of the multiple faces of state power that profoundly affected the lives and livelihoods of artisanal and small-scale miners -calling into question the practices of police units, environment authorities, mining license regulators, the Reserve Bank, and other arms of the state. 40 First, opposition members were clearly not happy that they had been forced into a unity government with ZANU-PF, after having thought that MDC won the election; the relation between the leaders of the two parties, in particular, was profoundly tense. Secondly, the statement also was read as ironic in that the main problem in the small-scale mining sector was clearly not conflict between small-scale miners; rather, conflict between miners and government institutions (including police, mining authorities and environment authorities) was a far greater concern of the small-scale miners present at the meeting.
Nonetheless, if a new and expanded political space for dialogue was indeed emerging, the presence of ministers at the meeting and their answers to miners' questions were at least regarded as a welcome step. At other moments in the meeting, the Minister was confronted with questions about the bureaucratic and costly EIA process, the lack of funding for education of miners, the need for technology assistance, the indiscriminate arrests of miners and the need to 'un-freeze' prospecting licenses that the government had been holding in limbo. 41 Control over mineral resource access was again fiercely debated on February 14, 2013 This provides a sharp contrast to the artisanal mining situation described in Ghana recently in this journal, where Hilson et al. (2013) argue that "numerous families have taken advantage of a low regulatory and police presence to undertake unlicensed small-scale gold mining and processing alongside their farming activities" (p. 122). A second key feature of the new association's meeting was that a sense of solidarity was also being shaped and adapted.
Artisanal and small-scale miners present at the meeting spoke out against repressive measures as well as the dominance of large-scale mining. 43 There were, however, social divisions among miners' organisations that had yet to be repaired, with diverse artisanal and smallscale miners' interests at stake. Unlike meetings in 2006 that had a strong presence of riverbed panners from the Zimbabwe Panners Association, the absence of riverbed panners at the February 2013 meeting indicated that panners were locked in a different kind of criminalised state and that the language of decriminalisation was less amenable to riverbed panning. Nonetheless, miners were making the case that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera should never be repeated and a new era of ASM support was urgently needed.
CONCLUSION
Academic discourses on illegal mining in Africa often emphasize the need for policing and tight enforcement of environmental policies. How a government actually goes about 'formalising' the gold mining economy is, however, intensely disputed. This article has examined how the conceptualisation of a police crackdown in Zimbabwe -allegedly a state initiative to formalise the mineral economy -requires careful attention both to immediate physical violence as well as long-term impacts on livelihoods. During the course of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, tens of thousands of small-scale miners across the country were arrested, and miners encountered varied faces of violent and at-times seemingly 'arbitrary' state power. Police stole miners' equipment, destroyed dwellings and inflicted other forms of physical violence. In addition, there was structural violence associated with income deprivation, with rural economic coping strategies virtually shut down in regional cases where police were heavily active such as Insiza District. Far from the kind of 'weak state' apparatus described in much of the broader (often West African-focused) literature on artisanal mining, the analysis of this study underscores a complex inter-relationship between different arms of a powerful state and diverse artisanal miners who were affected by Operation Chikorkoza Chapera.
Although some people profited from the illegal gold trade in conjunction with police corruption, the country's national budget was left poorer as a result of expensive police work and less gold being collected by government gold-buying offices. Amid hyperinflation and ever-increasing technocratic hurdles such as costly licensing requirements, it was impossible for many artisanal miners to operate within the law. Kamete (2012) (Hammar 2005; 3) .
To conclude, while policing actions that emanated from Operation Chikorokoza Chapera deepened frustration with state repression and fuelled distrust between miners and regulatory officials, the crackdown also needs to be understood in terms of the agency of marginalised segments of mining populations. As state discourses of mining sector regulation continue to be debated, the present study has provided a glimpse into how artisanal and small-scale miners have been seeking to regain a footing in the aftermath of violent crackdowns. It is important to stress the heterogeneity of the ASM sector in Zimbabwe, as some -but certainly not all -small-scale mining associations have been working, or able to work, in tandem with politically powerful actors. While 'state-induced displacements are not aberrations, but rather an ever-present possibility' (Hammar 2008; 417) , Operation Chikorokoza Chapera's legacy may ultimately be both the normalisation and contestation of mutating forms of repression via mining sector criminalisation.
Three days before the 2013 presidential elections, ZANU-PF officials made public statements pledging to support and empower ASM communities, fully cognisant of their political importance as a voting constituency (Chingono 2013) . In light of this populist rhetoric, it is all the more important to understand the legacies of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. While certain constituencies within the ASM sector have managed to recover, artisanal gold panning remains criminalised and those small-scale primary ore miners who are less politically connected continue to face a future of marginalisation. As artisanal mining continues to be an important livelihood strategy in Zimbabwe's ever-lasting economic and political crisis, more attention needs to be given to hidden dimensions of marginalisation and neglected voices in Zimbabwe's dynamic gold mining communities.
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